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ABSTRACT. In order to successfully introduce responsibility-sensitivity into theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived) it is not enough to merely draw distinctions between (1) different models of what responsibility-sensitivity requires in itself and (2) different normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity. We must also draw distinctions between (3) different roles played by responsibility-sensitivity within our theories; (4) different accounts of the strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice; (5) different accounts of the strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of political morality; and (6) different conceptions of the other requirements also incorporated into theories of justice and theories of political morality. The intended payoff of all this distinction-drawing is twofold: first, a more accurate, comprehensive, and illuminating account of the nature of the position of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice and theories of political morality; and, second, paving the way for a more sophisticated and analytically sharp research agenda on the subject of whether or not responsibility-sensitivity should have a position in our theories of normative political concepts in the face of mounting scepticism over its doing so, owing in part to the harshness/abandonment objection and the unfreedom objection.






It is supposed by many political philosophers that theories of justice (distributive and relational) should be responsibility-sensitive in some way or other and at least to some degree. But it is also widely thought that those theories which do embrace or cater to responsibility-sensitivity are subject to certain objections that would otherwise be avoided. For example, it has been argued that luck egalitarianism − a theory of distributive justice − is susceptible to the harshness/abandonment objection: that pursuing the aim of neutralising brute luck effects whilst at the same time holding people responsible for their voluntary choices means abandoning people who make unwise or imprudent choices (Anderson 1999; Fleurbeay 1995; 2005; Ripstein 1999; 2004; Scheffler 2005; Shiffrin 2004; Voigt 2007).​[1]​
In the classic formulation of the objection, due to Elizabeth Anderson, we are to imagine a driver without private health insurance who negligently makes an illegal turn that causes an accident with another car in which he (the negligent driver) is seriously injured. When the emergency services arrive on the scene they learn that the driver was to blame for the accident. According to Anderson’s reading of luck egalitarianism, it is just on this view for the ambulance team to leave the negligent driver at the side of the road to die. Even if they brought him to the hospital out of precaution, as soon as they discovered he was at fault for the accident and has no private insurance, it would be just for doctors to switch off his respirator. This abandonment of the imprudent and negligent driver (so the objection goes) is overly harsh and fails to capture the real point of egalitarian justice (Anderson 1999a: 295-6).
A number of ways of responding to the harshness/abandonment objection have emerged in the literature.​[2]​ I shall not try to rehearse all of them in this article, only those which strike me as the most promising, prima facie. One response is simply to grasp the nettle and insist that abandoning people who make imprudent choices is what justice requires. Nonetheless, added to this insistence is the further claim that there ought to be scope for helping even the imprudent – who fall below a minimum threshold, say – for important non-justice reasons, such as benevolence, humanitarianism, community, or solidarity (see Cohen 1989; 2006; 2009; 2011a; 2011b; Markovits 2007; Tan 2012). This is another way of saying that a theory of political morality (broadly conceived) is likely to incorporate both principles of justice and non-justice principles or goals. Of course, this response is likely to leave unsatisfied those theorists who are convinced that it can, and should, be possible to avoid the abandonment of the imprudent within the theory of justice.
Following on from this, various relational egalitarians have responded to the harshness/abandonment objection by arguing that luck egalitarian theories misconstrue the point of justice and, moreover, the position of responsibility-sensitivity within a theory of justice. On their view, what really matters for justice is people standing in relations of social equality to each other, or so-called democratic equality, and not necessarily holding people consequentially responsible for their voluntary choices (see Anderson 1999a: 312-5, 326-331; Markovits 2007: 284-9). In my (2005b), however, I pointed out that even democratic equality embraces responsibility-sensitivity (a) in its focus on capabilities rather than achieved functionings, (b) in not indemnify individuals against all loses due to unwise choices, and (c) in imposing compulsory insurance schemes which limit or constrain the extent to which unwise people can impose the costs of their bad choices on others. 
Alternatively, some writers have pursued the strategy of simply insisting that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism does not, in fact, tend to produce harsh consequences for the imprudent – at least, not in the real world – once we fully understand the true extent of the conditions that must be met under the relevant principles of equality of opportunity in order for people to be held responsible for the consequences of their choices (Kaufman 2004; Barry 2006; Voight 2007; Stemplowska 2016). This line of response can even be extended to personal decisions to eschew insurance. If some people possess lesser choice-making and choice-following abilities through no fault of their own, for instance, then even the decision to go uninsured could be a matter of ‘brute luck’ (lacking the ability to make and carry out prudent decisions) rather than ‘option luck’, and a compulsory public insurance scheme could be one way to neutralise this brute luck (differential levels of metaphysical responsibility for imprudent decisions) (Arneson 1997: 239; Brown 2005b: 301: Knight 2009: 141).
Finally, in my (2005b) I suggested that responsibility-sensitive egalitarians could stave off the harshness/abandonment objection by adopting a pluralistic or hybrid theory of egalitarian justice which encompasses elements of both luck egalitarianism and democratic equality. Others have also advanced pluralistic approaches to justice, such as by saying that luck egalitarianism should be combined with, or perhaps constraining by, forms of sufficientarianism or even equality of outcome (Casal 2007; Segall 2010; 2012). Consequently, it might be consistent with a form of pluralistic egalitarianism to say that people who would face a lack of effective access to valued functionings throughout their lives if they were left uninsured through personal choice, should nevertheless be compelled by law to take out private insurance or else enrolled into compulsory public insurance schemes, even if not qua the victims of brute luck (Brown 2005b: 302-3).​[3]​
However, because a number of these responses appeal to compulsory insurance as part of the solution to the problem of abandonment, they invite a further objection. Anderson herself puts this objection in terms of disrespectful paternalism (Anderson 1999: 295-6). Her objection is that it is disrespectful to people to mandate private insurance or enrol them into compulsory public insurance schemes based on the rationale that, through regretful bad luck on their part, they are too stupid to make prudent decisions about private insurance. I have previously argued that this rationale is not necessarily disrespectful, contrary to what Anderson claims (Brown 2005b: 301-2). I have also suggested that with a pluralistic or hybrid theory it is possible to appeal to alternative, non-luck based rationales for compulsory insurance, not least that enrolment into a compulsory insurance scheme guarantees that people have effective access to valued functionings throughout their lives, whilst at the same time honouring to some degree the demands of responsibility-sensitivity by preventing the imprudent from imposing all the costs of their bad choices on others.
However, after more than a decade, it now occurs to me that there is another variant of the objection that deserves to be taken seriously. According to what I shall call the unfreedom objection, many of the aforementioned replies to the harshness/abandonment objection appeal to compulsory insurance, but such policies might be inherently objectionable, quite apart from the rationale given for them, because they come at the cost of the specific freedom to choose to live without insurance and potentially to face the full consequences of imprudent choices (good or bad). I am certainly not alone in pointing out this objection (see also Voigt 2007: 406; Stemplowska 2011: 127).
In light of all this, I shall in this article pursue a slightly more unconventional line of response to both the harshness/abandonment objection and the unfreedom objection. This response involves reverting to a deeper, meta-level question: how, in general terms, can, and should, responsibility-sensitivity figure in theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived)? The thought is that only by asking and answering this deeper question can we hope to fully understand and come up with the correct solutions for the objections and controversies surrounding responsibility-sensitivity.​[4]​
To date the best example of this strategy, I believe, can be found in the work of Zofia Stemplowska. To be precise, Stemplowska seems to believe that to fully comprehend the extent of the aforementioned controversies, we must try to get clearer about (1) the meaning of responsibility-sensitivity, that is, about the particular demands that responsibility-sensitivity makes on a just distribution, and (2) the normative grounding of, or the justification for, responsibility-sensitivity, that is, the fundamental principles that explain why or in virtue of what the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity hold, or justify the adoption of, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity. In terms of (1), by distinguishing between different ‘models’ of the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity (so the argument runs) we can come to see why some responsibility-sensitive theories of justice seem to support harsh/abandoning policies (in virtue of how these theories understand the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity) (see Stemplowska 2011: 121-31). Moreover, by distinguishing between different normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity, it is possible to construct the most fitting case for those models – or that one model – of responsibility-sensitivity which could potentially rescue the relevant theories of justice from the harshness/abandonment objection (116-121, 130-3).
	However, I believe that although getting clearer about both the meaning and the normative grounding of, or justification for, responsibility-sensitivity is welcome, it only gets us part of the way to understanding how to bring responsibility to justice in ways which could potentially answer the harshness/abandonment objection ​and the unfreedom objection. In order to make full progress we must bear in mind the following six distinction-drawing enterprises. 

(1) Drawing distinctions between different meanings of responsibility-sensitivity, which is to say, different models of what responsibility-sensitivity requires in itself. This could mean drawing a distinction between laissez-faire and interventionist versions of responsibility-sensitivity in terms of whether others should not be forced to assist people who make bad choices or whether others should be prevented from assisting people who make bad choices. This also includes, in my view, drawing a distinction between strict and flexible versions of responsibility-sensitivity with regards to bearing some of the consequences or the full consequences of bad choices.
(2) Drawing distinctions between different normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity, namely, different explanations as to why or in virtue of what the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity hold, or else different reasons to believe that we should accept the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity. This includes drawing a distinction between normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity that ultimately appeal to respect for moral equality and those that appeal to respect for social equality.
(3) Drawing distinctions between different roles played by responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived). This includes drawing a distinction between responsibility-sensitivity playing a central or peripheral role.
(4) Drawing distinctions between different accounts of the importance, force, or strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice (distributive and relational) relative to other requirements that are also incorporated into those theories. This includes drawing a distinction between responsibility-sensitivity being strong, moderate, or weak relative to other requirements of justice.
(5) Drawing distinctions between different accounts of the importance, force, or strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of political morality (broadly conceived) relative to other considerations that are also incorporated into those theories. This includes drawing a distinction between responsibility-sensitivity being strong, moderate, or weak relative to other requirements of political morality.
(6) Drawing distinctions between different meanings or conceptions of the other sorts of requirements that are also incorporated into theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived).

	Keeping in mind these different enterprises, it seems to me that there are two main traditions within the literature on responsibility-sensitivity and the harshness/abandonment objection. Within the first tradition there is a tendency to conflate the aforementioned enterprises or else to focus on (1) and (2) whilst overlooking (3), (4), (5), and (6) (see Shiffrin 2004: 273-4, 274n.6; Markovits 2007: 302; Stemplowska 2011: 115-6, 130-1). In this article I shall argue that (3), (4), (5), and (6) have as much − and perhaps more − to tell us about what to think about responsibility-sensitivity as (1) and (2). In this way I situate myself within a second tradition within the literature on responsibility-sensitivity − a tradition that, amongst other things, places an emphasis on how responsibility-sensitivity relates to other aspects of justice and other values of political morality (see Brown 2005b: 307; Barry 2006: 99-101; Segall 2007: 188-191; Knight 2009: ch. 6). 
The intended payoff of adopting the above theoretical framework is twofold: first, a more accurate, comprehensive, and illuminating account of the nature of the position of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived); and, second, paving the way for a more sophisticated and analytically sharp research agenda on the subject of whether or not responsibility-sensitivity should have a position in our theories of normative political concepts in the face of mounting scepticism over its doing so, owing in part to the harshness/abandonment objection and the unfreedom objection.
	The remainder of the article is structured thusly. Section II explains in more detail the nature of the six enterprises, (1)−(6), and the relationship between them. Section III outlines an existing theoretical framework in the literature, due to Zofia Stemplowska, which distinguishes between three different models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism in the context of the harshness/abandonment objection. Section IV seeks to carve out space for, and motivate the importance of, my own theoretical framework by critically evaluating Stemplowska’s distinction. I argue that although Stemplowska tends (implicitly) to portray her distinction as a matter of (1) and (2), her account ignores a key aspect of enterprise (1), overlooks the fact that her distinction is also necessarily a matter of (3), (4), and (5), and pays insufficient attention to (6). Finally, Section V applies the new theoretical framework outlined in Section II, and attempts to show how and why it is possible that moderate luck egalitarianism, democratic equality, and pluralistic theories of equality, justice, and political morality can be responsibility-sensitive but at the same time can stave off the harshness/abandonment objection and avoid the unfreedom objection.


II. THE SPLINTERING OF RESPONSIBILITY-SENSITIVITY

I want to begin by clarifying the nature of the six enterprises I have outlined above. Enterprise (1) has to do with identifying and teasing apart different accounts of what responsibility-sensitivity requires in itself. As indicated above, this could mean drawing a distinction between what I shall call laissez-faire and interventionist versions of responsibility-sensitivity. On the laissez-faire version, responsibility-sensitivity means, amongst other things, that others should not be forced to assist people who make bad choices. On the interventionist version, by contrast, responsibility-sensitivity means, amongst other things, that others should be prevented from assisting people who make bad choices. This is the chief enterprise in which Stemplowska is engaged it seems to me (see Stemplowska 2011: 121-31).
	This does not exhaust enterprise (1), however. For, one might also distinguish between forms of responsibility-sensitivity along the axis of the extent of consequences for which people should be held responsible. This might support a distinction between: strict responsibility-sensitivity, meaning that people should bear the full consequences of choices for which they are responsible (whether through laissez-faire or interventionist policies); and flexible responsibility-sensitivity, meaning that people should bear at least some of the consequences of choices for which they are responsible (again whether through laissez-faire or interventionist policies) but not necessarily the full consequences.
	One obvious challenge for this distinction is to determine what the ‘full consequences’ of choices really are. Even a flexible approach that requires responsibility for less than full consequences must provide a baseline test of what full consequences would be. For example, does ‘full consequences’ mean the ‘natural’ consequences that would ensue under a normal course of events? But what if normally the state does intervene to assist or compensate? Then it becomes a matter of working out, counterfactually, what would have happened to the choice-maker were it not for the intervention of the state? But what if in such cases friends and family normally save the day and help out people who make bad choices? The natural course of events for such people is that they end up being rescued by those who love and care about them. By contrast, what about people who not only make bad choices but who also lack friends and family, perhaps through no fault of their own? A person who grows up in care homes and ends up homeless may fit that bill. But these seem to be particularly extreme cases, in which bad choices are compounded by further bad luck events which might be unchosen (see also Brown 2009a: 38). So it may be hard to figure out what the ‘normal’ consequences of a given choice are, because in reality choices are linked to outcomes by dint of myriad other factors, not all of which can be described as simply given.
Instead, perhaps the distinction between strict and flexible approaches to responsibility is better framed as a matter of taking different positions on what the ‘stakes’ of people’s choices ought to be (see Olsaretti 2009), such that the strict approach means holding people responsible for the full consequences of their choices, in the sense of high stakes, and flexible approaches are those that recommend holding people responsibility for less than full consequences, or low stakes. Consequently, drawing distinctions is likely to be both a descriptive and normative enterprise: that is, it is likely to invoke descriptive bases for specifying higher and lower stakes, as well as the idea of ‘appropriate’ stakes, based on normatively relevant baselines, for given sorts of choices.
	At any rate, the point I want to take forward is that at least some theorists of justice do seem to interpret the meaning of responsibility-sensitivity along the aforementioned axis. Seana Shiffrin, for example, distinguishes between a version of responsibility-sensitivity which involves ‘strict choice-sensitivity’ or ‘strict cost internalization’ and a version that is more relaxed allowing for the public ‘accommodation’ of some of the costs of some choices (Shiffrin 2004: 273-5). Likewise, Daniel Markovits distinguishes between a version of responsibility-sensitivity (or ‘responsibility-tracking’) according to which the distribution of advantage should be ‘perfectly sensitive to differences in people’s choices’, signifying that society should ‘provide no compensation for the differential effects of choice’, and a version that permits ‘exceptions’ to the ‘full cost-internalization of choices’ (Markovits 2007: 275-6, 301-2). 
	What is involved in enterprise (2)? Put simply, this is about distinguishing either between different normative grounds that explain why or in virtue of what the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity hold or between different epistemic justifications or reasons to believe in the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity.​[5]​ Often the grounding explanations or the justifying reasons involve appeals to more fundamental egalitarian normative principles, but sometimes non-egalitarian considerations are invoked (Brown 2005a; 2009a; Marchman and Nielsen 2015).
	For her part, Stemplowska draws a distinction between normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity that appeal to the abstract egalitarian principle that a society must show equal respect for people viewed as beings with an equal moral status (respect for moral equality) and normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity that appeal to the abstract egalitarian principle that a society must show equal respect for people viewed as social equals, so that people stand in relations of equality with each other (respect for social equality) (Stemplowska 2011: 116-121, 130-3). 
	Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, Stemplowska does not mention the work of Ronald Dworkin in relation to her distinction. But presumably he is to be aligned with the former kind of normative ground or justification (respect for moral equality). Within Dworkin’s theory of distributive justice, for example, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity − that government must allow the distribution of resources at any particular moment to be ‘ambition-sensitive’ (Dworkin 1981: 311), ‘that the fate of each must be sensitive to his own choices’ (Dworkin 2000: 324), or that people’s wealth and other resources should ‘depend on the value and costs of their choices’ (Dworkin 2006: 108) − is derivative. According to Dworkin, the more fundamental principle the abstract egalitarian principle: that every citizen has a right to be treated with equal concern and respect by his or her own government (see Dworkin 1977: 180, 227; 1983: pp. 24-25; 1987: 7-8; 2000: 1-2; 2006: 97; 2011: 2-3). However, it also deserves mention that within Dworkin’s holistic theory of political morality, personal morality, and ethics, even the abstract egalitarian principle is itself derivative of two even more fundamental or two ‘very basic’ principles of human dignity: the principle of equal importance (that every human life is of intrinsic importance) and the principle of special responsibility (that each person bears a special responsibility for his or her own life, that is, for identifying and realising the intrinsic importance of his or her life) (Dworkin 2000: 4-7; 2006: 6-11, 96, 102; 2011: 330).​[6]​
	What is involved in enterprise (3)? As I shall understand it, this is about whether responsibility-sensitivity plays a central or peripheral role in theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived). I intend to interpret this distinction in terms of the following dimensions. First, are questions about responsibility among the central questions of justice that the theory is designed to answer? Second, does responsibility-sensitivity feature heavily in the paradigmatic cases that capture the essence of the theory? Third, do the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity figure prominently in the entailment or justification of policies under the theory? Finally, does responsibility-sensitivity have a prima facie status meaning that it is sufficient by itself to determine just outcomes within the theory?
	In order to bring the difference between central and peripheral roles into clearer perspective I shall focus on two theories of egalitarian justice: moderate luck egalitarianism and democratic equality. Now Anderson once said of democratic equality that it ‘takes a more nuanced approach to questions of personal responsibility than either barring these considerations altogether or letting them in without constraint’ (Anderson 1999b: s. 2). And, of course, it might be said that moderate luck egalitarianism also takes a nuanced approach in virtue of not barring these considerations altogether nor letting them in without constraint. However, I believe that there are subtle yet important differences between these two nuanced approaches.
	I begin with moderate luck egalitarianism. The literature contains a host of definitions of luck egalitarianism, but the twin requirements of neutralising luck and holding people responsible for the consequences of their voluntary choices against a background of equality of opportunity figure in all of them (see Cohen 1989: 920; 2006: 439; 2009: 18; Voigt 2007: 389-390; Segall 2007: 177). Yet moderate luck egalitarianism is typically defined as the view that the twin requirements of luck-neutralisation and responsibility-sensitivity are not all there is to distributive justice (see Brown 2005b: 298; Segall 2007: 188-191; Knight 2009: 199). G. A. Cohen, for example, identifies luck egalitarianism with ‘[t]he principle that only differential responsibility can justify inequality’ (Cohen 2006: 442). The use of ‘can’ rather than ‘does’ is crucial. For, it signals the fact that there may be circumstances in which not even differential responsibility (i.e., purely voluntary choices against a background of equality of opportunity) will justify certain inequalities owing to other salient normative reasons to object to those inequalities (Cohen 1989: 908-9). The moderate luck egalitarian explains this fact in terms of the existence of other aspects of justice, or even other values of political morality, that are acknowledged by the theory.
	Nevertheless, I believe that responsibility-sensitivity plays a central role in moderate luck egalitarianism along with luck-neutralisation. First, among the core or basic questions of justice that the theory is designed to answer is a question about which equalities and inequalities people are and are not the results of choices for which people are rightly held responsible. Second, responsibility-sensitivity also features heavily in the paradigmatic cases that capture the essence of the theory. Third, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity figure prominently in the entailment or justification of policies under the theory. Finally, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity have a prima facie status, meaning that it is enough or sufficient by itself to establish just outcomes within the theory unless it is qualified, limited, constrained, or trumped by other dimensions of justice or other political values, many of which go unnamed in the basic specification of the theory.
	Turning now to democratic equality, this theory of relational justice is composed of the following set of ideas: that justice demands the abolishment of relationships of oppression, domination, and exploitation and the promotion of relationships of equality (Anderson 1999a: 313); that justice means an equal entitlement to the capabilities necessary to avoid oppressive social relationships and to the capabilities necessary for functioning as equal citizens in a democratic state (316); that justice entails that we view society ‘as a system of co-operative, joint production’ (320-1); that figuring out what justice requires in given cases should involve the test of interpersonal justification, according to which ‘any consideration offered as a reason for a policy must serve to justify that policy when uttered by anyone else who participates in the economy as a worker or consumer’ (322). Indeed, Anderson has argued that the prominence given to interpersonal justification, as opposed to third-personal justification, is a key difference between luck egalitarians and relational egalitarians and, what is more, ‘is the source of the other disagreements between luck egalitarians and relational egalitarians’ (Anderson 2010: 3).​[7]​
	I believe that responsibility-sensitivity plays a peripheral role in democratic equality. First, the central questions of justice that the theory is designed to answer are questions not about responsibility as such but questions about social relationships. This is not to say that responsibility-sensitivity never figures in the right sorts of social relationships, and never crops up in applications of the interpersonal justification. It is clear that some of the social relationships and policies advocated by Anderson do involve responsibility-sensitivity (Anderson 1999a; 1999b; see also Brown 2005b). Rather, it means to say that the central questions of justice are first and foremost questions about social relationships of equality. Second, responsibility-sensitivity does not feature heavily in the paradigmatic cases that capture the essence of the theory. Third, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity do not figure prominently in the entailment and justification of policies under the theory. At the level of entitlement to respect as social equals and at the level of the core right to basic capabilities, responsibility plays no role, albeit it does play a role at the level of people’s actual achievement of valued functionings. I shall say more about this difference below. Moreover, within that central part of the theory which relates to interpersonal justification, responsibility-sensitivity plays a role merely as one reason among many others that can be put for and against policies within the scheme of interpersonal justification: it has not special position. Finally, responsibility-sensitivity has no prima facie status, meaning that it is not one of a limited number of core principles that together are sufficient by themselves to determine just outcomes within the theory.
	Enterprise (4) involves drawing distinctions between different accounts of the importance, force, or strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice (distributive and relational) relative to other requirements that are also incorporated into those theories. For example, one might distinguish between: strong responsibility-sensitivity, meaning that the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity are qualified, limited, constrained, or trumped by no other requirements that are part of the theory of justice (distributive and relational) in which it figures (if any exist), and that the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity themselves qualify, limit, constrain, or trump all other requirements that are part of the theory of justice (distributive and relational) in which it figures (if any exist); moderate responsibility-sensitivity, meaning that the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity are qualified, limited, constrained, or trumped by at least one other requirement that is part of the theory of justice (distributive and relational) in which it figures (if any exist), and that the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity themselves qualify, limit, constrain, or trump at least one other requirement that is part of the theory of justice (distributive and relational) in which it figures (if any exist); and weak responsibility-sensitivity, meaning that the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity are qualified, limited, constrained, or trumped by all other requirements that are also part of the theory of justice (distributive and relational) in which it figures (if any exist), and that the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity themselves qualify, limit, constrain, or trump no other requirements that are part of the theory of justice (distributive and relational) in which it figures (if any exist).
	Some theorists have incorporated the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of distributive justice which also incorporate other requirements, but without clarifying whether the relative strength of responsibility-sensitivity is strong, moderate, or weak. Richard Arneson, for example, defends what he calls ‘responsibility-catering prioritarianism’ as the correct theory of distributive justice, according to which the moral value of a gain in welfare or utility is: (a) greater as the amount of welfare or utility it affords the person increases, (b) greater the lower the person’s welfare or utility prior to receipt of the gain, (c) greater, the greater the person’s degree of virtue or, more broadly, desert, and (d) lesser, the greater a person’s degree of responsibility for his or her position prior to receipt of the benefit (see Arneson 1999a; 1999b; 2000; 2001; 2004; 2010). Yet Arneson does not pause in these formulations of the view to stipulate how much importance, weight, or force should be given to the utilitarian, prioritarian, desert, and responsibility elements respectively. If one believes − and I am not suggesting that this is what Arneson himself believes (or disbelieves) − that the relationship between (a), (b), (c), and (d) is a hierarchy of lexical priorities in which (a) is lexically prior to (b) – meaning that (a) must be satisfied in full, and (b) is introduced only to break any ties between different ways of satisfying (a) -- (b) is lexically prior to (c), and (c) to (d), then one would be assigning responsibility-sensitivity weak strength within responsibility-catering prioritarianism, according to the above account of relative strength.​[8]​
	The relevance of assigning different strengths to responsibility-sensitivity vis-à-vis the harshness/abandonment objection is this. The objection says, for instance, that luck egalitarianism requires, from the point of view of justice, the abandonment of the negligent driver (or else some attempt to compel him to pay for his own medical expenses). So it is an objection to versions of luck egalitarianism that have this requirement. But a version of moderate luck egalitarianism that does not have this requirement, such as one in which responsibility-sensitivity only has weak or moderate weight within the theory, will be immunised from this objection.
	Next, what is involved in enterprise (5)? Like (4), this enterprise can be viewed as drawing distinctions along an axis of importance, weight, or force. And so, responsibility-sensitivity can be weak, moderate, or strong within a theory of political morality (broadly conceived) relative to other sorts of normative political values − for example, freedom, legitimacy, the good.
	Markovits, for example, argues that distributive justice ‘reflects only one facet of a wider scheme of obligations that persons owe to one another’ (Markovits 2007: 281), and that, when it comes to the circumstances described by the harshness/abandonment objection, other considerations ‘outweigh distributive justice’ (ibid.). Specifically, ‘humanitarian considerations − which are triggered by absolute need and are therefore invariant with respect to questions of responsibility − require aiding even the most foolhardy, once their state becomes sufficiently bad’ (ibid.). This would seem to imply that responsibility-sensitivity has only weak strength within the relevant theory of political morality (as a whole).
Employing even more refined reasoning, Kok-Chor Tan argues that we should see the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity as only applying to part of the distribution, namely, the part that sits above a minimum threshold, or at the point at which everyone already has their basic human needs satisfied (Tan 2012: 119-123). In this way, responsibility-sensitive theories of justice (distributive and relational) are only a part of a larger theory of political morality, which itself has scope over various different domains including the domain of allocation of emergency rescue resources or the domain of satisfying basic human needs. In effect, responsibility-sensitivity is limited to the domain of distributive justice (120-1). Of course, one could think that Tan goes too far in separating off the different domains. After all, arguably certain questions of political morality fall into both the domain of emergency rescue (or satisfying basic human needs) and the domain of responsibility-sensitive distributive justice. A society committed to providing emergency medical care even to people who act negligently might wonder whether or not it is nevertheless right to require recipients of emergency care to repay what they have received ex post (in whatever way possible) on grounds of responsibility-sensitivity, for instance (Bou-Habib 2006: 255; Brown 2009a: 22; Knight 2009: 200; Marchman Andersen and Nielsen 2015: 205-6). This question seems to fall into one than one domain of political morality simultaneously. In any event, Tan would perhaps insist that when push comes to shove and people cannot afford to repay the costs of any assistance they have received, principles of distributive justice must fall to principles of rescue and satisfaction of basic human needs.​[9]​ Once again, this would seem to imply that responsibility-sensitivity has only weak strength within the theory. 
On the other hand, one might think that responsibility-sensitive distributive justice is not trumped by all other moral considerations within the theory. One might think that upon the umpteenth occasion that a person has been rescued or given life-saving medical care, questions of responsibility can no longer be set aside. In triage situations, for instance, there are only so many times an alcoholic can be given a scarce liver transplant before responsibility trumps assessments of basic medical need. In other words, one cannot artificially confine responsibility-sensitivity simply to the domain or sphere of distributive justice, when it clearly has relevance and some strength in the sphere of human need (Gutmann 1995: 112-114). If so, then it seems plausible to think that responsibility-sensitive distributive justice can have at least moderate strength within the theory of political morality (broadly conceived).
Finally, what is involved in enterprise (6)? This is, of course, the analogue of enterprise (1), only it is focused on the meaning of other requirements. It is a matter of drawing distinctions between different conceptions of the other requirements that might also figure in theories of justice (distributive and relational) and theories of political morality (broadly conceived). For example, this enterprise might include drawing a distinction between conceptions of freedom. 
Whilst freedom is conceptualised by some liberals as a matter of having choices over option ranges (such that limiting the option range normally means reducing freedom) (Feinberg 1980: chs. 1 and 2), such conceptions do not exhaust the possibilities. Consider an alternative conception according to which ‘real freedom’ is defined not merely in terms of the absence of external constraints but also enjoying access to the capacities and resources necessary to seize opportunities provided by the absence of external constraints, and to do so throughout one’s life or unconditionally (see van Parijs 1995). Or else, consider a republican conception according to which citizens can only be free when they live under public institutions which protect their independence from exercises of arbitrary power, or guarantee for them the conditions of ‘non-domination’ (see Pettit 1996; 2001; 2006; 2011).
	Having now clarified these six distinction-drawing exercises, we can ask another question: how do they interact with each other? Does adopting certain lines of thinking under some of the enterprises either entail or debar certain lines of thinking under some of the other enterprises, or are any theories one develops under one compatible with any answers one develops under the others? 
It is, I think, obvious that these enterprises are related in the practical sense that, for some theorists, the positions they adopt in relation to one enterprise will make them more inclined to adopt certain positions in relation to some of the other enterprises. Logical entailment is a different matter, however. For example, because some theorists take the view – under enterprise (3) – that responsibility-sensitivity plays a central role in a theory of justice, they may be more inclined to affirm that responsibility-sensitivity is a moderate or strong pro tanto consideration in their theory of justice – under enterprise (4). But this does not strike me as a logical entailment. Similarly, how one normatively grounds or justifies responsibility-sensitivity – under enterprise (2) – could motivate one’s position on other issues, such as whether it plays a central or peripheral role in a theory of justice, whether it has weak, moderate, or strong pro tanto weight within one’s theory of justice – under enterprise (4) – or indeed one’s theory of political morality – under enterprise (5). Indeed, how one conceptualises the meaning of responsibility-sensitivity, and how one conceptualises the meaning of other requirements, such as freedom, for instance – under enterprises (1) and (6) – could make certain positions vis-à-vis the other enterprises more or less plausible. But once again it is hard to see these connections as logical entailments.
Nevertheless, I believe that the real payoff of logically separating these six distinction-drawing enterprises, and of highlighting the special importance of enterprises (3), (4), (5), and (6), and not just (1) and (2), is that doing so illuminates or provides the groundwork for a better understanding of certain controversies surrounding responsibility-sensitivity than existing theoretical frameworks in the literature. Therefore, in order to motivate the superior analytical power of my theoretical framework, I now wish to focus on the work of Stemplowska and her existing theoretical framework.


III. STEMPLOWSKA’S THREE MODELS OF RESPONSIBILITY-SENSITIVE EGALITARIANISM

In her article, ‘Responsibility and Respect: Reconciling Two Egalitarian Visions’ Zofia Stemplowska proffers a distinction between what she calls ‘three models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’ (Stemplowska 2011: 121-31). She does so with an eye on the controversy surrounding responsibility-sensitivity and the harshness/abandonment objection, that is, in the context of canvassing a model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism which is best placed to stave off that objection.
	On Stemplowska’s first model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, responsibility-sensitivity requires that normal reasons to reduce inequality no longer apply where those inequalities result from voluntary choices against a background of equality of opportunity. Putting this another way, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity do not demand redistribution in response to unequal outcomes when they are caused by choices, unless equality of opportunity is itself structured in such a way as to include a compulsory insurance scheme that indemnifies people against the distributive outcomes of some choices (Stemplowska 2011: 121-2).
	Stemplowska points out that this model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism may have some unexpected results depending on how equality of opportunity is operationalised. Suppose equality of opportunity is operationalised to include the formal institution of a compulsory public insurance scheme that, amongst other things, gives emergency medical care and compensation payments to people in dire straits, including people who make negligent or imprudent choices. This formal institution partly constitutes people’s equal opportunity sets we might say. Defined in this way, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity on a distribution are compatible with people making imprudent and negligent choices but nevertheless receiving emergency medical care or compensation payments (Stemplowska 2011: 122). This is because the prudent cannot reasonably object that they face unequal opportunities as compared to the imprudent when the compulsory public insurance scheme is partly constitutive of equality of opportunity (123-4). 
In fact, I believe that the unexpected results do not end there. For, we might also suppose that equality of opportunity is operationalised to include an informal social practice of friends helping out friends who get themselves into trouble even when they do so by making unwise choices. This informal social practice also partly constitutes people’s equal opportunity sets. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that everyone has had an equal chance to enjoy the benefits of the social practice of friendship, meaning that everyone has an equal chance to make friends, maintain friendships over time, have equally rich friends, and have equally generous friends. Under these conditions, the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity are compatible with people making unwise choices but nevertheless receiving assistance from friends. Once again, the wise cannot object to the assistance given to the unwise on the grounds that they (the wise) have enjoyed unequal opportunity if everyone has had an equal chance to enjoy the benefits of the social practice of friendship.
	Stemplowska observes that modelling responsibility-sensitivity in this way, with the inclusion of a compulsory public insurance scheme which covers even imprudent choices, ‘has the potential to transform what has normally been seen as a harsh doctrine into a more gentle doctrine of accommodation’ (Stemplowska 2011: 122). However, as she also observes, this model seems to cut against the grain of another common sense understanding of responsibility-sensitivity, namely, that people who make imprudent choices should end up with worse outcomes than people who make prudent choices (Stemplowska 2011: 125).
	Consequently, on a second model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, responsibility-sensitivity requires that certain sorts of bad choices − imprudent, lazy, less productive, negligent, reckless, unambitious, feckless, unwise − necessarily result in worse distributive outcomes relative to good choices (Stemplowska 2011: 124-5). Kristin Voigt seems to have in mind this model of responsibility-sensitivity when she interprets the demands of luck egalitarian justice as follows. ‘[I]f luck egalitarianism requires that the option luck victim not be given assistance, then not only is no one required, as a matter of justice, to help the option luck victim; luck egalitarians would have to oppose such transfers, even if they are voluntary’ (Voigt 2007: 391).
This second model, as Stemplowska rightly explains, would cut against operationalising equality of opportunity so that it included a compulsory public insurance scheme which covers even bad choices. Such a scheme would violate the model: it would enable people who make bad choices to evade bad distributive outcomes (Stemplowska 2011: 126). Of course, people who make bad choices will have had to pay into the compulsory insurance scheme, just like people who make good choices. But what people pay into the scheme will not cover what they end up receiving out of the scheme in assistance or compensation in the event that their bad choices produce bad consequences. So people who make good choices will end up cross-subsidising people who make bad choices and wind up with bad consequences.​[10]​
	It seems to me − although Stemplowska does not mention it − that this model would also rule out an attempt to operationalise equality of opportunity so that it included an informal social practice of friends helping out friends who get themselves into trouble through unwise choices. Such a social practice would get in the way of bad choices resulting in bad consequences. And so the second model might support the case for a legalistic prohibition on this sort of practice. After all, the second model says not merely that there is a reason of justice to abolish state institutions which assist people that have made bad choices but also that there is a reason of justice to intervene to stop private individuals from assisting people that have made bad choices. (Of course, it would require further analysis of specific theories to show whether or not they are instances of the second model, and have the aforementioned implications for the practice of friends helping out friends.)
	Stemplowska suggests that we might have an additional reason to embrace the second model, in which people who make bad choices are not permitted to evade the consequences of their choices, based on the value of freedom. This is because a compulsory public insurance scheme, of the sort allowed under the first model but apparently ruled out under the second model, itself involves a significant form of unfreedom: the freedom to live without insurance and when push comes to shove potentially face the full consequences of one’s bad choices (Stemplowska 2011: 127; see also Voigt 2007: 405-6). In other words, a model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism that happens to rule out an institution of compulsory insurance thereby rules out an institution which imposes unfreedom on people.
In fact, it strikes me that a concern with freedom would also provide a reason to reject the second model if, as I have suggested above, it implies that there is a reason of justice to intervene to stop private individuals from assisting friends that have made unwise choices. Being free to assist even unwise friends − and most people have at least one − is a freedom that ordinary people cherish since it underpins the social practice of friendship. This social practice of friendship creates a clash between distributive justice and freedom for the simple reason that friendships distribute benefits across society and do so unequally (see Otsuka 2004; 2006; Lazenby 2010; Cordelli 2015). Since not everyone enjoys friendships and not all friendships are created equal, some people who make bad choices will be spared bad consequences by friends, whereas others will not. 
	Notwithstanding all of these points, Stemplowska also (implicitly) rejects the second model on the grounds that it fails to show equal respect for people as moral equals (respect for moral equality). Specifically, there are situations in which, says Stemplowska, requiring that bad choices result in bad outcomes, such as by ruling out a compulsory public insurance scheme, is likely to do significant damage to the essential human interests (Stemplowska 2011: 130n.30) of people who make bad choices, either by allowing them to suffer consequences that damage their essential human interests or by forcing them to avoid certain activities in ways that also damage their essential human interests. By contrast, instituting a compulsory public insurance scheme would advance the essential human interests of such people, but at the same time would do little or no damage to the essential human interests of people who make good choices. This is because the burden of paying into the scheme is not significant enough (ex hypothesi) to harm their essential human interests. Under these circumstances, it would not be right, claims Stemplowska, to insist on the second model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (127-8). Arguably this is because a model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism that permitted significant damage to the essential human interests of some people cannot claim to show respect for morality equality, to view all people as beings with equal moral status.
	According to Stemplowska’s third model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, responsibility-sensitivity permits us to construct opportunity sets for people which involve enrolment into compulsory public insurance schemes whenever the burdens or sacrifices involved in asking people who want to engage in certain risky activities to (a) desist in those risky activities, (b) pay for expensive private insurance, or else (c) bear the consequences of uninsured risk-taking – all measured in terms of essential human interests – outweighs the burden placed on, or sacrifices that are made by, other people who must also pay into the scheme and cross-subsidise this risk-taking – again measured in terms of essential human interests (Stemplowska 2011: 128-9). Stemplowska claims that, by virtue of placing onto the balancing scales the essential human interests of everyone concerned, this third model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism ‘is in fact meant to capture the idea that we must respect each other as beings with equal moral status and our own lives to lead’ (130).

IV. ASSESSING STEMPLOWSKA’S DISTINCTION

I now want to try to evaluate Stemplowska’s framework distinction between three models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism through the lenses of my own theoretical framework, based on six distinction-drawing enterprises, (1)−(6). I shall make six main points. The first relates to the fact that Stemplowska’s main line of distinction between the first and second models is the shift from laissez-faire to interventionist readings of responsibility-sensitivity: from the claim that nobody should be forced to assist makers of bad choices to the claim that nobody should be allowed to assist such people.
	However, note that the second model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism specifies merely that certain sorts of bad choices must necessarily result in worse distributive outcomes than good choices (Stemplowska 2011: 125). In itself, therefore, the second model, as specified, is potentially ambiguous between the strict reading and the flexible reading of the meaning of responsibility-sensitivity, that I earlier identified with enterprise (1). 
According to the flexible reading, responsibility-sensitivity specifies that makers of bad choices should be held responsible for some of the consequences (whether through laissez-faire or interventionist policies), but this does not necessarily mean that such people should be held responsible for the full consequences of their bad choices. According to the strict reading, by contract, responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism specifies that makers of bad choices should be held responsible for the full consequences of their bad choices (whether through laissez-faire or interventionist policies). 
More importantly, I believe that in order to properly understand both the nature of Stemplowska’s second model and why it, unlike Stemplowska’s first model, succumbs to the harshness/abandonment objection, one has to more carefully engage with enterprise (1) and take note of the distinction between strict and flexible readings of responsibility-sensitivity. After all, Stemplowska’s second model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism seems overly harsh, in the sense of insisting that people suffer the consequences of their bad choices – by ruling out compulsory public insurance schemes and social practices of friendship – partly if responsibility-sensitivity is given a strict reading. On the flexible reading, by contrast, a maker of bad choices need only be worse off than others, or even slightly worse off, but not necessarily suffer the full consequences of his or her bad choices. So, the motivation for Stemplowska’s claim about the inferiority of the second model (and the move to the third model) depends on her taking the strict as opposed to the flexible reading of responsibility-sensitivity.
	Now it might be objected here that the flexibility of the flexible reading is a weakness in the sense that in order for the responsibility-sensitive policy planner to understand how he or she ought to structure the distribution of outcomes under the flexible interpretation responsibility-sensitivity, he or she will need further guidance on how much worse the outcomes of bad choices should be relative to the outcomes of good choices. But the flexible interpretation does not offer this guidance. Then again, perhaps this lack of guidance is a virtue. The flexible reading is designed to give the responsibility-sensitive policy planner discretion: in the sense that he or she could plan for bad outcomes to have slightly worse, moderately worse, or much worse outcomes than good outcomes, depending on other considerations of political morality, such as freedom or efficiency.
	My second main point concerns Stemplowska’s comments about the second model, in terms of it ruling compulsory public insurance schemes which themselves involve unfreedom. It is that appealing to the value of freedom can point in different directions depending on which conception of freedom one is invoking. On some conceptions of freedom, introducing a compulsory insurance decreases the range of options people have to choose between and in that sense makes them less free. On other possible conceptions of freedom, however, being denied the right to live without compulsory insurance is not a morally relevant form of unfreedom. For example, as Stemplowska herself points out, there might also be a reason of freedom to maintain a compulsory insurance scheme, so as to underpin people’s capacities and opportunities to enjoy the exercise of freedom in the future (Stemplowska 2011: 127). This defence of compulsory insurance might follow from a commitment to some form of maximin- or sufficientarian-based real freedom for all. To take another example, a republican conception might entail instead that citizens can only be free when they live under public institutions which protect their independence from exercises of arbitrary power, or guarantee for them the chance of non-domination, where such institutions might conceivably include compulsory insurance. The upshot is that choosing between different models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism will partly depend on enterprise (6). Although enterprise (6) does appear in Stemploska’s discussion of compulsory insurance schemes, it does not figure explicitly and directly in her theoretical framework of three models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism.
My third main point is that some of the controversy around the three models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism turns on enterprises (4) and (5). In the case of freedom, accepting or rejecting different models of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism because of what they say about compulsory public insurance schemes and the social practice of friendship, will partly depend on one’s conception of freedom – under (6) – but surely it will also partly depend on the relative strength of responsibility-sensitive in relation to the value of freedom within theories of justice (distributive and relational) − under enterprise (4) − and within theories of political morality (broadly conceived) − under enterprise (5). If, for example, freedom is among the distribuenda of a theory of distributive justice or is viewed as constitutive of relational justice because freedom is crucial to relationships of equality among social equals, then it might also be assigned significant importance, force, or strength within those theories.
	In fact, the controversies surrounding compulsory insurance schemes do no begin and end with the value of freedom. The literature on luck egalitarianism contains many interesting arguments for requiring people to take out private insurance or else introducing compulsory public insurance schemes – whether directly through a compulsory public insurance premium or indirectly through taxes on unhealthy products or risky activities – of the sort that would stave off the harshness/abandonment objection. Consider the following. One set of arguments for compulsory insurance appeal to responsibility-sensitivity. For one thing, making people who are prone to making bad financial decisions, leading unhealthy lives, or engaging in risky activities take out private insurance would compel them to pay the expected costs of their decisions. Likewise, and a compulsory public insurance scheme would ensure that such people pay (ex ante) at least something toward the assistance or compensation they will need in the event that their bad choices lead to bad consequences. Without compulsory insurance other people might feel compelled for humanitarian reasons to assist, and in that scenario people who make bad choices avoid all the costs and become a drain on others (Rakowski 1991: 76n.4). For another, compulsory insurance ensures that people who make bad choices but nevertheless get lucky and do not suffer bad consequences still have to make a contribution to the safety net, and in that sense take some responsibility for their actions (Albertsen 2015: 356).
	A second argument for compulsory insurance appeals to the requirements of luck-neutralisation. If choice-making and choice-following abilities are a matter of birth or upbringing beyond the control of the agent, then a compulsory public insurance scheme might be justified as a method of mitigating the influence of brute luck on people’s life prospects, rather than holding people responsible for their choices (Arneson 1997: 239; Brown 2005b: 301).
A third argument for a compulsory public insurance scheme that indemnifies even imprudent people against the possible outcomes of their unhealthy or risky courses of action rests on a reconceptualisation of what it means to take a bad, irrational, or imprudent risk. Some risky courses of action (so the argument goes) are rational attempts to maximise expected utility based on the (unequal) options people may be faced with (Vallentyne 2002; Segall 2007).
A fifth argument for compulsory insurance invokes the epistemology difficulties in accurately applying the twin requirements of luck-neutralisation and responsibility-sensitivity. Put simply, a compulsory public insurance scheme is a legitimate pragmatic response to the inherent uncertainty and fallibility of practical judgements about the ultimate causes of imprudent choices (leading to bad outcomes), including judgements about whether or not people can be deemed responsible for imprudent choices given the possibility that there is no such thing as free will (see Knight 2009: 141, 152; 2015: 132-3). 
A sixth argument for compulsory insurance is straightforward paternalism. The basic idea is that it would be in people’s best interests if they had basic insurance and, what is more, this is what people themselves would recognise under conditions more ideally suited for rational decision-making, such as under conditions of full information and sustained calm reflection (Dworkin 1981: 295; 1989: 484-5; 2002: 114-5; 2006: 37; 2011: 370; Rakowski 1991: 76n.4, 80-81).
A final argument for compulsory insurance is that it is a way of ensuring that people are held at least partly responsible for their choices but at the same time guaranteeing that people have reliable and stable access to a valued functionings throughout their lives, whether for egalitarian or non-egalitarian reasons of justice, or else for non-justice reasons of political morality (broadly conceived) (Anderson 1999a: 326-7; Dworkin 2002: 114; 2006: 73; Brown 2005b: 302-3; Barry 2006: 100; Bou-Habib 2006: 251-6). But whatever the reason, according to the present argument, the aim of the compulsory insurance is not an attempt to neutralise brute luck.
	I believe that with the exception of the first argument, all these arguments make assumptions, explicit or implicit, about the relative strength of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice (distributive and relational) relative to other egalitarian, or indeed non-egalitarian, requirements that might also be incorporated into those theories – under (4) – and potentially assumptions about the relative strength of responsibility-sensitive justice (distributive and relational) within theories of political morality (broadly conceived) relative to other considerations that might also be incorporated into those theories – under (5). What differentiates the aforementioned arguments is not merely the nature of the other requirements being invoked – be they requirements of justice or non-justice requirements of political morality – but also the weight (weak, moderate, strong) assigned to responsibility-sensitivity relative to these other requirements.
	No doubt some people (including some luck egalitarians) will say that arguing for a compulsory public insurance scheme − as part of a response to the harshness/abandonment objection − based on non-egalitarian considerations is not an attractive option for luck egalitarians: because it concedes the fact of its explanatory weakness. A better solution from the perspective of maintaining the integrity of luck egalitarianism, might be one that is internal to luck egalitarianism or at the very least broadly egalitarian (see Segall 2007: 193; Brown 2014: 459-460; Knight 2015: 122-4). Be that as it may, it strikes me that the aforementioned arguments speak to the controversy surrounding responsibility-sensitivity and the harshness/abandonment objection not merely from the perspective of enterprises (1), (2), and (3), but also from the perspective of enterprises (4) and (5).
	I now turn to my fourth main point. As outlined in Section II, I believe that Stemplowska tends (even if implicitly) to present or frame her distinction between the second and third model of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism as instances of enterprises (1) and (2).	However, it seems to me that the crucial difference between the second and third models rests on a more basic distinction between different ways of seeing the relative strength of the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity within a theory of justice (distributive and relational) – under enterprise (4). For, there is a sense in which responsibility-sensitivity has an identical core meaning in both the second and third models, namely, that certain sorts of bad choices should necessarily result in worse distributive outcomes (in the interventionist sense); the difference is simply that in the second model the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity are qualified, limited, constrained, or trumped by no other requirements, and so are strong within the theory, whereas in the third model the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity are qualified, limited, constrained, or trumped by another requirement, and so possesses either moderate or weak strength within the theory. What is this other requirement that trumps the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity within the third model? It is the requirement of achieving the right sort of balance between protecting the essential human interests of both the prudent and the imprudent or, to put it another way, the maximisation of the protection of essential human interests: it means getting to a point where providing a compulsory public insurance scheme for people who make imprudent choices prevents significant damage to essential human interests without at the same time causing even more significant damage to essential human interests on the part of those who must pay for the scheme (Stemplowska 2011: 128-30). What enterprise (4) tells us is that the requirement of responsibility-sensitivity possesses greater strength in the second model than in the third model because in the third model, but not the second model, that requirement falls to the requirement of maximising the protection of essential human interests.
	My fifth main point has to do with the enterprise of identifying the most fitting fundamental principle as the normative grounds of, or justification for, responsibility-sensitive theories – under enterprise (2). Stemplowska raises an important question about the place of responsibility-sensitivity even within theories of relational justice such as Anderson’s democratic equality. Stemplowska points to various policy recommendations that Anderson makes that put into effect or are compatible with the requirements of responsibility-sensitivity. And Stemplowska attributes this to democratic equality being normatively grounded in, or justified by, the fundamental principle of respect for social equality (Stemplowska 2011: 118-9; 132). In particular, Stemplowska claims that, for Anderson, the requirement that society shows respect for people as social equals is ‘conditional’ on those people maintaining certain forms of responsible behaviour (132). According to Stemplowska, this is why democratic equality incorporates certain responsibility-sensitive policy implications (ibid.).
	I do not read Anderson in this way, however. Rather, for Anderson, the basic entitlement to respect as social equals is unconditional. What is open to conditionality, by contrast, is what that entitlement to respect ultimately means vis-à-vis achieved valued functionings. Let me explain what I mean. Anderson endorses a capability-based theory of relational justice (Anderson 1999a; 2010). Democratic equality involves ensuring that people enjoy basic capabilities, which in turn means guaranteeing they have effective access to valued functionings (i.e., the valued beings and doings associated with living as human beings, participants in the system of joint production, and equal citizens). It is only in relation to the notion of access − to whether or not, and how, valued functionings are achieved − that conditionality comes in. According to Anderson, although people have an unconditional right to ‘effective access’ to valued functionings, ‘[e]ffective access means that people can achieve that functioning but only by deploying means already at their disposal, not that the functioning is unconditionally guaranteed without any effort on their own part’ (Anderson 1999a: 318). And so, those who are able-bodied must achieve the income they need by earning a wage or fulfilling some other role in the system of cooperative joint production (321). So, for example, in terms of a democratic equality inspired system of disability benefits, Anderson makes it clear that ‘to administer this system, some limited judgements of individuals’ capacities to function in the manner required need to be made’ (Anderson 1999b: s. 2). She continues: ‘For those suspected of abusing the worker’s disability system, some determination must therefore be made if whether they are actually capable of holding down a job and just malingering, or truly disabled or otherwise effectively unemployable’ (ibid.).  
Pace Stemplowska, therefore, I do not believe that the right to respect as a social equal is itself conditional under Anderson’s democratic equality conception of relational justice. What I mean, specifically, is that under Anderson’s conception the right to respect as a social equal is constituted by the right to basic capabilities, as in, effective access to valued functionings. But within this right, so to speak, the actual achievement of valued functionings is responsibility-sensitive and conditional. The right itself is unconditional, on her view. As Anderson herself puts it, ‘[i]t is not a starting-gate theory, in which people could lose their access to equal standing through bad option luck’ (Anderson 1999a: 319).
	Now Anderson does suggest that a person could ‘forfeit some of her market inalienable freedoms, however, if she is convicted of a serious crime’ (Anderson 1999a: 319n.76). Nevertheless, this suggestion does not, I take it, amount to Anderson proposing that rightly convicted prisoners forfeit their right to ‘effective access to the means of sustaining one’s biological existence’ and the right to ‘access to the basic conditions of human agency’ (317-8). These rights surely remain unconditional even though both the extent of them and the way valued functionings are achieved may differ significantly for rightly convicted prisoners. So a prisoner may forfeit a right to freedom of movement beyond the prison walls but presumably retains a right to basic freedom of movement such as an allocated daily ‘yard time’ or a right to move around within a reasonable sized prison cell as opposed to being shackled to a bed twenty-four hours a day. And a prisoner may also forfeit the right to pick and choose what meals and beverages will be available and at what times during the day but retains a right to access to enough food and water to sustain life. But even here surely it could be said that prisoners retain their basic right to treatment as social equals. After all, if they did forfeit this basic right, then we would readily countenance forms of cruel and unusual punishment, which are arguably among some of the most extreme manifestations of unequal social relationships, and of oppression, domination, and exploitation, in existence. Since we do not countenance these punishments, it seems hard to say that prisoners forfeit their basic right to treatment as social equals. Moreover, even prisoners would presumably retain the right to be at least included in processes of interpersonal justification, even if a loss of liberty for committing serious crimes would pass the test. To deny them this right of inclusion in such processes would be to violate their fundamental right to respect as social equals.
	My final main point has to do with the role played by responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice and political morality – under enterprise (3) – including in terms of the policy recommendations that follow from it. Consider some policy recommendations that might be justified under both moderate luck egalitarianism and democratic equality. One such policy recommendation is a compulsory public insurance scheme that gives emergency medical care and compensation payments to people in dire straits, even people who make bad choices. Earlier I identified an argument for such a scheme that appealed to a combination of (flexible) responsibility-sensitivity (guaranteeing that people who make bad choice are bearing at least some of the costs) and the importance of ensuring that all citizens have reliable and stable access to valued functioninings throughout their lives. Arguably this argument could be, and has been, made by moderate luck egalitarians (Voigt 2007: 405), democratic egalitarians (Anderson 1999a: 326-331), pluralist egalitarians (Brown 20105b: 302-3), and pluralist justicarians alike (Segall 2010: ch. 1). Another example would be a special tax on packets of cigarettes, which is used to partly fund the treatment of smoking-related diseases. Yet another would be a special tax on rich people who choose to build their vacation homes in disaster-prone areas, which is used to partly fund public disaster relief mechanisms. Here too it would seem possible to justify the policy recommendations by appealing to a combination of (flexible) responsibility-sensitivity and the importance of ensuring that people have reliable and stable access to valued functionings throughout their lives. And, once again, the argument is open not merely to proponents of democratic equality (Anderson 1999a: 323n.82, 328) but also to defenders of moderate luck egalitarians (Roemer 1998: 51-52; Knight 2005: 59n.18), pluralist egalitarians (Gutmann 1995: 112-114), pluralist justicarians (Segall 2010: 46-47), and pluralist political moralists (Marchman Andersen and Nielsen 2015: 203-4).
	But how, more exactly, do these policy recommendations come to follow from moderate luck egalitarianism and democratic equality respectively? In the case of moderate luck egalitarianism, the first-choice policy is always one that meets the requirement of responsibility-sensitivity (along with the requirement of luck-neutralisation). When it transpires that other dimensions of justice or other values dictate that there must be a safety-net of basic capabilities for all citizens, then the requirement of responsibility-sensitivity strongly prefers the aforementioned policies to alternatives that permit the imprudent to externalise the full costs of their choices. Responsibility-sensitivity figures prominently in the justification of the policy reommendations. 
In the case of democratic equality, by contrast, we must ask, amongst other things, whether the aforementioned policies can survive the test of interpersonal justification. In doing so we attempt to formulate reasons for these policies that could serve to justify them when uttered by anyone else in the society, including not merely someone who is imprudent but also someone who would be compelled to fund the costs of assisting people who are imprudent should they need it. These reasons include saying that we are all in this together, that we all have obligations to assist one another when our basic capabilities are threatened, but also that everyone must share the responsibility for funding the costs of assistance from which everyone benefits (Anderson 1999a: 330-1). In this way it is interpersonal justification that figures prominently in the justification of the policy recommendations: responsibility-sensitivity only enters the story in the shape of one reason that can be uttered by the prudent as well as the imprudent. Now what this does mean, of course, is that democratic equality does not bar considerations of responsibility. But, then again, neither does it treat these considerations as central to the theory of egalitarian justice it puts forward, unlike moderate luck egalitarianism.


V. THE NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED

Using my theoretical framework (i.e., bearing in mind all six distinction-drawing enterprises), rather than the existing framework found in the work of Stemplowska, I believe provides a more accurate, comprehensive, and illuminating account of the nature of the position of responsibility-sensitivity within theories of justice and theories of political morality. Moreover, I believe that this theoretical framework paves the way for a more sophisticated and analytically sharp treatment of how responsibility-sensitivity theories might stave off the harshness/abandonment objection and at the same time deal with the unfreedom objection. To be more precise, I believe that my approach enables me to say something true and substantial about exactly what type of responsibility-sensitive theory of justice (distributive and relational) or theory of political morality (broadly conceived) is most likely to plot a successful course around the aforementioned objections, and how.​[11]​
Thus, it seems to me that a responsibility-sensitive theory is more likely to succeed in the relevant sense: (1) if it adopts a flexible as opposed to strict model of responsibility-sensitivity, as well as a laissez-faire as opposed to interventionist model of responsibility-sensitivity; (2) if it coherently matches the normative grounds of, or justifications for, responsibility-sensitivity with the particular requirements of responsibility-sensitivity and associated policy-recommendations which it is proposing; (3) if responsibility-sensitivity plays a peripheral as opposed to central role; (4) if responsibility-sensitivity is weak or moderate as opposed to strong relative to other requirements of justice (distributive and relational); (5) if responsibility-sensitive justice (distributive and relational) is weak or moderate as opposed to strong relative to other considerations of political morality (broadly conceived). In addition, I can suggest that: (6) theorists who adopt a conception of freedom in which merely being denied the opportunity not to purchase compulsory insurance does not necessarily constitute a reduction of freedom, then this would also undercut the unfreedom objection, albeit for exogenous reasons. 
To pursue the last suggestion a little further, perhaps an even more interesting question is what one’s conception of freedom would say about the practice of friendship, in circumstances where friendship can alleviate the harshness of policies of responsibility-sensitivity (pursued by the state), but friendship provides such benefits to people unequally. Perhaps a theorist’s favoured normative grounds of, or justification for, responsibility-sensitivity – under (2) – may influence how the same theorist conceptualises freedom – under (6). It could be that if one grounds or justifies responsibility-sensitivity based on a fundamental principle of equal concern and respect, for instance, then one might also adopt certain conceptions of freedom grounded in the same way or justified for the same reason. It could be that these deeper considerations support a moralised theory of freedom, such that people do not have the right to a kind of freedom to engage in practices that confer unjust benefits on people – unjust because the benefits are a matter of brute luck for those people or because they violate interventionist responsibility-sensitivity. Or, maybe such a theorist would affirm that the fundamental principle of equal concern and respect, properly understood, implies the adoption of conceptions of distributive equality and freedom according to which gifts ought to be treated in public policy terms as permissible but also taxable (see Dworkin 2004: 352-3).
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^1	  This is, of course, not the only objection (see Brown 2005b; Knight 2009; Arneson 2011; Lippert-Rasmussen 2016), but it shall be my focus in this article.
^2	  For an overview, see Brown (2005) and Knight (2015).
^3	  Of course, there are also those who would say that if the only way to defeat the harshness/abandonment objection is to adopt a moderate or constrained luck egalitarian position, then this is a hollow victory: either because it concedes rather than challenges the fatal flaw in egalitarianism (Knight 2015) or because the hybrid position might end up being not meaningfully egalitarian after all (Brown 2014). I shall not discuss these thorny issues here, however.
^4	  I would also place into this broader tradition the work of  HYPERLINK "http://journals.sagepub.com/toc/psxa/64/3" Olsaretti (2009) and McTernan (2016).
^5	  For more on the distinction between normative grounding and justification, see Sangiovanni (2016).
^6	  Dworkin typically focuses on the way that derivative principles are interpretations of fundamental principles (see Brown 2009b; forthcoming), and does not always carefully clarify whether the fundamental principles are supposed to normatively ground or instead epistemically justify the derivative principles. 
^7	  For a critique of Anderson’s diagnosis, however, see Lippert-Rasmussen (2015: 226-9).
^8	  Note that similar sorts of questions do not hang over Paula Casal’s proposal for ‘sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism, which allows that some inequalities in outcome may arise justly but denies that individuals’ having less than enough is ever justifiable by appeal to voluntary choice’ (Casal 2007: 322). Here sufficiency always trumps responsibility-sensitivity.
^9	  But for further critical responses to Tan, see Knight (2015).
^10	  Note, Shlomi Segall has previously dubbed this ‘the grudge objection’ to compulsory public insurance schemes (Segall 2007: 184-5).
^11	  No doubt some people believe that theories of justice (distributive and relational) and political morality (broadly conceived) have, or should have, essentially nothing to do with responsibility-sensitivity. And a subset of such people may hold this belief whatever the outcome of the controversy surrounding the harshness/abandonment objection and the unfreedom objection. But this article has not been addressed to such people.
